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 Abstract  
 
The Basel II capital accord has fostered the debate over the financial stability of the aggregate 
banking sector. There is a large empirical literature focused on the effects of macroeconomic 
disturbances on the banking system. Specifically, loan losses are an important factor for the 
banking stability and a stream of research in this field aims to identify explanatory variables for 
this critical indicator.  
This paper focuses on Italian banks data over the period 1990-2007 and investigates the 
relationship between the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the business cycle and 
firms’ indebtedness so as to test the impact of both real and financial fragility on banks’ default 
losses. We use a regression model with an interaction term representing the joint effect  of real 
and financial fragility, which to our knowledge has never been applied before to Italian default 
data. The results show that the impact of financial fragility on default losses is enhanced by 
adverse economic conditions. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The new Basel Capital Accord, known as Basel II (BCBS, 2006), has fostered the debate over 
the financial stability of the aggregate banking sector. Banks’ loan losses are an important factor 
for financial stability and hence a relevant stream of research has focused on analysing the 
determinants of losses.  
In particular, it is well known that banks’ losses coming from borrowers’ default are affected by 
the economic conditions and this gives rise to concerns about procyclicality of capital 
requirements under Basel II.  Additionally to a wide empirical literature (e.g. Bangia et al. 
(2002), Altman et al. (2002) among many others), the dependence of credit risk factors on 
business cycle is analysed in Allen and Saunders (2003), who provides a survey of cyclical 
effects in credit risk models.  
The empirical literature testing the relation between banks’ performances and the business cycle 
is huge; some authors (e.g. Leaven and Majnoni (2003), Ayuso et al. (2004) among others) focus 
on provisions through the business cycle while others consider realized default losses. Among 
the letters, Sales and Saurina (2002) find an important contemporary impact of economic cycle 
on bad loans on Spanish data. Gambera (2000) identifies a set of macroeconomic variables 
(bankruptcy filings, -farming- income, state annual product, housing permits, and national 
unemployment) as predictors for problem-loan ratios on US data. Hoggarth et al. (2005) 
document the link between the UK business cycle and banks’ write-off. Quagliariello (2007), 
Quagliariello and Marcucci (2007) and (2008) analyse Italian data within different econometric 
frameworks (panel data on 1985-2002 annual bank specific data, threshold model on 1990-2005 
quarterly aggregate data, and VAR on  1990-2004 quarterly aggregate data respectively) and 
focusing on the relation between business cycle and default rates. Pesola (2005) and (2007) 
analyse the impact of macroeconomic shocks on banks’ losses on European countries, paying 
particular attention to the Nordic countries. In particular, these two works consider 
macroeconomic variables and financial fragility as explanatory variables in a non-linear model: 
the final aim in this case is the understanding of factors causing banking crises. 
In the same spirit as Pesola (2005) and (2007), we aim at analysing how real as well as financial 
conditions impact  banks’ loan losses. We apply a comparable model to Italian data, considering 
a real variable, a financial variable and their interaction as explanatory variables for losses. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section II explains the rational for the econometric model 
adopted. Section III presents the data and Section IV discusses the empirical results and compare 
them with the existing empirical literature. Section V concludes and provides some directions for 
further research.  
 
II. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
The aim of this work is to analyse some critical determinants of banks’ loan losses at an 
aggregate level. The dependent variable, the banking system loan losses, is defined as a 
percentage of total loans (DR). We are interested in analysing the impact of economic and 
financial conditions on losses: in line with Marcucci and Quagliariello (2007), we measure 
economic conditions by means of the difference between actual GDP and its linear trend (GDPT) 
and we interpret it as a measure of ‘real fragility’. Moreover, in line with Pesola (2005), we 
consider the ratio of total loans to GDP (INDEB) as a measure of financial fragility, since the 
banking system is fragile when  borrowers have high debts (i.e. high loans) compared to total 
output.  
In order to test the hypothesis that both real and financial fragility affect banks’ loan losses, we 
use three nested models. We start with the simplest model based on the relation between  GDP 
and default losses: the model is presented in equation (1), where DR is the percentage aggregate 
loss, GDPT is the deviation of GDP from its linear trend and e is the error term. 
    
ttt eGDPTDR ++= −11βα                                                                                                             (1) 
 
Consistently with previous studies, we expect a negative coefficient β1 since lower GDP values, 
i.e. recessionary regime, determines higher default losses1. 
Second, we define in equation (2) a regression model to capture how the two variables 
representing real and financial fragility affect the evolution of the banks’ loan losses. The 
regressors are both one period lagged.  
  
tttt eINDEBGDPTDR +++= −− 1211 ββα                                                                                      (2) 
                                            
1 We use one lag in line with Marcucci and Quagliariello (2007).  
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We assume that financial fragility (INDEB) positively affects default losses.  
Thirdly, we define in equation (3) the model with the interaction term of financial and real 
fragility.   
 
tttttt eGDPTINDEBINDEBGDPTDR +⋅+++= −−−− 1131211 βββα                                              (3) 
 
The model in equation (3) allows to consider the joint effects of the real and the financial 
explanatory variables. Pesola (2005) proposes a model with joint terms only: in this work we aim 
to catch both the linear effect of each explanatory variable and the effect of each variable 
conditional to the other. Indebtedness may affect default loss depending on the specific GDP 
value: namely, we expect greater sensitivity to indebtedness during a recession, since the impact 
of financial fragility on default losses is enhanced by real fragility. This means that we expect a 
particularly high loss rate when both the indebtedness is high and GDP is low. 
 
III. DATA 
 
The models presented in Section II are estimated over Italian quarterly data spanning over the 
period 1990Q1-2007Q2. We use data from two sources: the Bank of Italy Statistical Bulletin for 
loans and default data for Italian non-financial borrower firms, the ConIstat for GDP data.   
The dependent variable DR is computed as the ratio of the flow of new defaulted debts in the 
reference quarter to the stock of performing loans of the previous one2.  The explanatory variable 
GDPT is quantified by real (seasonally adjusted) GDP while the variable INDEB is obtained as 
the ratio of outstanding loans over nominal (seasonally adjusted) GDP.  
Since data from the Bank of Italy are available both at aggregate level and separately by different 
categories, we exploit the distinction of firms by loan size to define two groups representing 
                                            
2 The Bank of Italy database provides historical series of total and non-performing loans both in terms of number 
and monetary amounts: in order to model the loss rate and the financial fragility variable, we used the latter 
measure. Moreover, in order to define the loss rate we should consider the recovery rates as well as the data on 
defaults. As a proxy we use the default data only, so that the variable LR is quantified as the aggregate default rate. 
The variable is the same used in Marcucci and Quagliariello (2007). 
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small and medium-large enterprises respectively3.  Table 1 sums up the variables employed in 
the paper as for their construction and source. 
 
Table 1 – Data Description 
Name Description Formula  Period Source 
DR_C 
 
Default Rate for the aggregate 
corporate sector  
(Flow of new bad debt (t) / 
outstanding performing loans (t-
1))*100 
1990Q1-
2007Q2 
Bank of Italy 
DR_S Default Rate for the small business 
with  reliance used <= 500,000 
euro 
(Flow of new bad debt (t) / 
outstanding performing loans (t-
1))*100 
 
1990Q1-
2007Q2 
 
Bank of Italy 
 
DR_ML 
Default Rate for the medium-large 
business with  reliance used > 
500,000 euro 
(Flow of new bad debt (t) / 
outstanding performing loans (t-
1))*100 
 
1990Q1-
2007Q2 
 
Bank of Italy 
 
INDEB_C 
 
Indebtedness to the corporate 
sector 
 
(outstanding performing loans to 
corporates (t) / nominal seasonally 
adjusted GDP (t))*100 
 
1990Q1-
2007Q2 
 
Bank of Italy 
 
INDEB_S 
 
Indebtedness to the small 
enterprises 
 
(outstanding performing loans to 
small enterprises (t) / nominal 
seasonally adjusted GDP (t))*100 
 
1990Q1-
2007Q2 
 
Bank of Italy 
 
INDEB_ML 
 
Indebtedness to the medium-large 
enterprises 
 
(outstanding performing loans to 
medium-large enterprises (t) / 
nominal seasonally adjusted GDP 
(t))*100 
 
1990Q1-
2007Q2 
 
Bank of Italy 
 
GDPT 
Output Gap as deviation of the 
actual GDP from the potential 
expressed as a linear trend   
(Seasonally adjusted real GDP – 
GDP Trend) / GDP Trend 
 
1990Q1-
2007Q2 
 
ConIstat 
 
Figure 1 graphs the main variable employed in this study over the business cycle  phases, based 
on the OECD turning points dates. Looking at the GDPT graph the negative peak in 1992-1993 
is clearly the outcome of an unfavourable economic period after the European Monetary System 
                                            
3 In order to distinguish between small and medium-large companies, the amount of credit drawn is used as a proxy 
for the firm size; this criterion is also taken by other authors (e.g. Sironi and Zazzara 2003). In this work, in order to 
exploit the categories in the public database of the Bank of Italy, we define an obligor to be a small company when 
the credit used is less than 500,000 euro, while the company is considered a medium-large one when the credit used 
exceeds this threshold.  
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crisis and the peak in 1995 reflects the crisis of the Southern banking system (see e.g. Marcucci 
and Quagliariello, 2008). The strong recession in 1992-1993 is clearly associated to high default 
rates. 
 
Fig. 1 Data 
   
0,1
0,3
0,5
0,7
0,9
1,1
1,3
1,5
1,7
19
90
/1
19
91
/1
19
92
/1
19
93
/1
19
94
/1
19
95
/1
19
96
/1
19
97
/1
19
98
/1
19
99
/1
20
00
/1
20
01
/1
20
02
/1
20
03
/1
20
04
/1
20
05
/1
20
06
/1
20
07
/1
DR_C
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
19
90
/1
19
91
/1
19
92
/1
19
93
/1
19
94
/1
19
95
/1
19
96
/1
19
97
/1
19
98
/1
19
99
/1
20
00
/1
20
01
/1
20
02
/1
20
03
/1
20
04
/1
20
05
/1
20
06
/1
20
07
/1
DR_S
 
   
0,1
0,3
0,5
0,7
0,9
1,1
1,3
1,5
1,7
19
90
/1
19
91
/1
19
92
/1
19
93
/1
19
94
/1
19
95
/1
19
96
/1
19
97
/1
19
98
/1
19
99
/1
20
00
/1
20
01
/1
20
02
/1
20
03
/1
20
04
/1
20
05
/1
20
06
/1
20
07
/1
DR_ML
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
19
90
/1
19
91
/1
19
92
/1
19
93
/1
19
94
/1
19
95
/1
19
96
/1
19
97
/1
19
98
/1
19
99
/1
20
00
/1
20
01
/1
20
02
/1
20
03
/1
20
04
/1
20
05
/1
20
06
/1
20
07
/1
GAPT
 
   
1,1
1,3
1,5
1,7
1,9
2,1
2,3
19
90
/1
19
91
/1
19
92
/1
19
93
/1
19
94
/1
19
95
/1
19
96
/1
19
97
/1
19
98
/1
19
99
/1
20
00
/1
20
01
/1
20
02
/1
20
03
/1
20
04
/1
20
05
/1
20
06
/1
20
07
/1
INDEB_C
 
Note: the colored bands on the background of each graph represent the recession periods according to the OECD 
dating of the business cycle turning point. 
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Descriptive statistics of the variables used and the relative correlation matrix are provided in the 
Appendix. Two different tests for stationarity are performed over the selected variables. First of 
all we employed the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test which cannot reject the null of a unit 
root for the dependent variable (DR) and the financial fragility explanatory variable (INDEB). 
However, given the low power of ADF test in small sample, we applied the  Kwiatkowski test 
(KPSS) as well: this test fails to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity at least at 1% for all the 
series involved in our main empirical analysis (see Section IV). Therefore, in the analysis, the 
variables included are all in level, keeping their original meaning.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
We first estimate the baseline model presented in equation (1): since we grouped corporates by 
small and medium-large firms, we estimate the same baseline model on the aggregate default 
rate and separately on the two groups’ default rates.  
 
Table 2 – Baseline Model   
 1. Aggregate corporate sector 2. Small business sector 3. Medium-Large Corporate sector 
 
α 
 
0.650185 
(0.057860) 
*** 
 
0.644233 
(0.034896) 
*** 
 
0.654996 
(0.063147) 
*** 
 
β1 
 
-0.097713 
(0.040492) 
** 
 
-0.053005 
(0.022622) 
** 
 
-0.108916 
(0.044881) 
** 
R2 0.175451 0.159064 0.174873 
Adj. R2 0.163145 0.146513 0.162558 
F-Stat 14.25656 (0.000341) 12.67312 (0.000688) 14.19963 (0.000350) 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 – 2007Q2  Method: Least Squares, Newey-West HAC Standard errors and covariance  (standard errors are 
reported in brackets)*, **, *** confidence level respectively to 10%, 5%, 1% 
 1. Baseline model – Aggregate corporate sector -          DR_Ct = tt eGDPT ++ −11βα  
 2. Baseline model – Small Business –                           DR_St = tt eGDPT ++ −11βα  
 3. Baseline model – Medium/Large companies -          DR_MLt = tt eGDPT ++ −11βα  
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The results of the estimation, reported in Table 2, confirm the well-known negative relationship 
between default rate and GDP. Small business are less dependent on macroeconomic conditions, 
being more affected by specific risks.  
Once explained the baseline model, we focus on small corporates only, which represents the 
engine of the Italian economy covering the 99,92% of the total Italian enterprises4. 
Table 3 shows the results of the regression model defined by equation (2): both regressors are 
significant and R2 is higher than the baseline model. The signs of coefficients are as expected: 
the coefficient on GDPT is still negative, while the coefficient on INDEB is positive as financial 
fragility increases default rates. 
 
Table 3    Two regressors model 
      
α 
0.644899 
(0.030963) 
*** 
 
β1 
-0.040854 
(0.016989) 
** 
 
β2 
2.463000 
(0.807940) 
*** 
R2 0.315949 
Adjusted R2 0.295221 
F-Stat (prob) 15.24204 (0.000004) 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 – 2007Q2 Method: Least Squares, Newey-West HAC Standard errors and 
covariance  (standard errors are reported in brackets) 
*, **, *** confidence level respectively to 10%, 5%, 1 
 Small Business no interaction model: 
     DR_St = ttt eSINDEBGDPT +++ −− 1211 _ββα  
                                            
4 See ISTAT (2007) 
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In order to capture the joint effect of the two regressors, we estimated the model defined in 
equation (3) which included the interaction term.  
 
Table 4     Interaction model 
     
α 
0.643329 
(0.031960) 
*** 
 
β1 
-0.041143 
(0.016987) 
** 
 
β2 
2.400064 
(0.787990) 
*** 
 
β3 
-0.179700 
(0.443534) 
 
R2 0.317605 
Adjusted R2 0.286109 
F-Stat 10.08423 (0.000015) 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 – 2007Q2 Method: Least Squares, Newey-West HAC Standard errors 
and covariance  (standard errors are reported in brackets) 
 *, **, *** confidence level respectively to 10%, 5%, 1% 
 
 Small Business no interaction model: 
tttttt eGDPTSINDEBSINDEBGDPTSDR +⋅+++= −−−− 1131211 ___ βββα        
 
The regression coefficients reported in Table 4 have all the expected signs: the negative sign on 
the interaction term coefficient can be interpreted by rewriting equation (3) as follows: 
 
( ) 113211 __ −−− ⋅+++= tttt SINDEBGDPTGDPTSDR βββα                                                      (4) 
 
By means of the interaction term, the slope coefficient of the variable INDEB on the loss rate 
can be seen as dependent upon the value of GDPT. By considering three particular values of 
GDPT,  GDPTM, GDPTH, GDPTL, corresponding to the mean value of GDP and one standard 
deviation above and below the mean respectively, simple regression lines are generated by 
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substituting these values into the equation (4). The results5 are reported in Table 5. The slopes of 
the three regressions have the same sign: the difference between the three equations consists in 
the magnitude of the sensitivity of the loss rate to the indebtedness. The equation is steeper when 
the GDPT  is negative: this means that an increase of indebtedness, in recessionary economic 
conditions, leads to a more intense increase of default rate than in expansionary phases, that is 
the impact of financial fragility on default losses is enhanced by the real fragility. The coefficient 
on the interaction term however is not significant and therefore we can only comment its 
meaning without a strong statistical support.  
 
Table 5    Simple Conditional Regression Equations 
( ) 113211 __ −−− ⋅+++= tttt SINDEBGDPTGDPTSDR βββα  
    GDPTt-1= 1.333174 1_1598.25877.0_ −⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR  
                     GDPTt-1=0 1_3994.26425.0_ −⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR  
    GDPTt-1= -1.333174 1_6389.26972.0_ −⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR  
 
Pesola (2007) proposes an econometric model with interaction terms only6 , which is therefore 
not directly comparable with our estimation. He presents the estimation of the linear and the 
“combined model” as well: however in this case most of the variables turn out to be not 
significant.  
It has to be noted that the Italian default rates are significantly lower on average in the last years: 
this can be associated to the publication of the January 2001 document of Basel II, which 
possibly led banks to adopt more severe credit standards  and therefore to improve borrowers’ 
risk features. Therefore we introduce a dummy variable to control for the reduction in default 
rates from January 2001 on7. The results are reported in Table 6.  The dummy is significant, 
confirming a reduction in default rates starting from 2001. Moreover, by controlling for the 
general credit quality improvement likely following the Basel II document, the interaction term 
                                            
5 The introduction of the interaction term requires the continuous explanatory variables to be centred in order to 
avoid distorsions in the coefficients of the single regressors coefficients (see Aiken and West, 1991). 
6 Pesola (2007) estimates his model on annual data and its dependent variable is the actual loss rate.  The regressors 
are the product terms of macroeconomic shock and financial fragility and interest rates shock and financial fragility 
additionally to the lagged loss rate. 
7 The same dummy is introduced in Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008). 
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becomes significant (supporting the idea presented before) and the R2  significantly improves8.  
 
Table 6    Interaction model with dummy 
     
α 
0.728784 
(0.021976) 
*** 
 
β1 
-0.025715 
(0.010925) 
** 
 
β2 
1.735314 
(0.555276) 
*** 
 
β3 
-0.889328 
(0.355931) 
** 
γ  -0.243729 
(0.039117) 
*** 
R2 0.724467 
Adjusted R2 0.707246 
F-Stat 42.06919 (0.000000) 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 – 2007Q2 Method: Least Squares, Newey-West HAC Standard errors 
and covariance  (standard errors are reported in brackets) 
 *, **, *** confidence level respectively to 10%, 5%, 1% 
 
 Small Business no interaction model: 
tttttt eDGDPTSINDEBSINDEBGDPTSDR ++⋅+++= −−−− 20011131211 ___ γβββα  
 
In particular, Table 7 presents the simple regression equations emerging from conditioning the 
default rate to three specific values for GDPT: the impact of financial fragility on the loss rate is 
clearly higher for lower GDP values. Moreover, the coefficient comes out to be strongly 
significant for negative GDPT values while it is not significant for positive GDPT (see Table 8): 
this stylized analysis suggests that indebtedness contributes to increase default rates only if 
combined with adverse economic conditions. 
                                            
8 We tested the residuals for unit root by ADF test: the residuals come out to be stationary. 
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Table 7  Simple Conditional Regression Equations  
GAPTt Before 2001Q1 After 2001Q1 
1.3332 
1_54968.06945.0_ −⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR
 
1_54968.045077.0_ −⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR
    0 _73531.172878.0_ −⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR
 
1_73531.148505.0_ −⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR  
   -1.3332 _92094.276307.0_ ⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR
 
1_92094.251934.0_ −⋅+= tt SINDEBSDR
 
Table 8  t-test for simple slopes 
Simple slope Standard error t-test 
0.54968 0.929321 5947.0
929321.0
54968.0 ==t  
1.73531 0.555276 12514.3
555276.0
735314.1 ==t *** 
2.92094 0.450954 47726.6
450954.0
92094.2 ==t *** 
*, **, *** confidence level respectively at 10%, 5%, 1% 
  
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this paper is to make a step forward in explaining the Italian banking sector’s 
aggregate loan default losses. The literature is rich of empirical papers focusing on the relation 
between business cycle and default losses, and a few papers analyse Italian data. In this work we 
analyse the Italian firms’ default rates over the period 1990-2007. In line with the model 
proposed in Pesola (2005), we consider the impact of both real and financial fragility. Moreover 
we consider the impact of the product term representing the interaction between real and 
financial fragility, which allows to quantify the impact of each explanatory variable conditional 
to the other. The basic idea behind the interpretation of the interaction is that indebtedness itself 
is a source of risk, especially if coupled with adverse economic condition. 
The main results of this paper can be summed up as follow. First, we confirm the negative 
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relationship between the business cycle and Italian firms’ default rates over our longer time 
period and find a positive relation between financial fragility and default rates. Moreover, by 
considering the interaction term, which as far as we know has never been applied before to 
Italian data, we find a more intense impact of indebtedness when the economic conditions are 
unfavourable.  
While we focused on default losses due to corporates credit extension (in particular small 
business), the next step is to analyse default losses due to the total of borrowers. This is 
important when considering the aggregate default losses as a source of banking crises. 
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Appendix – Descriptive statistics and correlation 
 DR_C DR_S DR_MG INDEB_C INDEB_S INDEB_MG GDPT     
Mean 0.647352 0.643144 0.651587 1.575123 0.274035 1.301088 -0.02577     
Median 0.576488 0.593865 0.550231 1.479508 0.276297 1.192883 -0.125600     
Maximum 1.472593 1.057474 1.591571 2.194182 0.320919 1.900153 3.250775     
Minimum 0.250964 0.426771 0.220524 1.229006 0.229159 0.930300 -2.707867     
SD 0.309421 0.176046 0.345606 0.273396 0.029131 0.273224 1.315758     
Skewness 0.868631 0.638403 0.970988 0.633274 -0.016465 0.576174 0.340578     
Kurtosis 2.922616 2.324753 3.142459 2.133348 1.583905 1.997244 2.608834     
Jarque-Bera 8.820207 6.084732 11.05873 6.869414 5.852025 6.805827 1.773829     
Probability 0.012154 0.047722 0.003969 0.032235 0.053610 0.033276 0.411925     
ADF test1 *  **    **     
KPSS test2 ** ** **  *       
            
CORRELATION DR_C DR_S DR_ML GDPT GDPT(-1) INDEB_C INDEB_C(-1) INDEB_ML INDEB_ML(-1) INDEB_S INDEB_S(-1) 
DR_C 1.000000 0.904786 0.997898 -0.415739 -0.418869 -0.620125 -0.577269 -0.651845 -0.616136 0.283139 0.362616 
DR_S 0.904786 1.000000 0.876892 -0.398787 -0.398828 -0.646542 -0.608478 -0.690246 -0.659743 0.393910 0.475638 
DR_ML 0.997898 0.876892 1.000000 -0.414276 -0.418178 -0.597828 -0.554853 -0.628163 -0.592180 0.270683 0.348253 
GDPT -0.415739 -0.398787 -0.414276 1.000000 0.930584 -0.036905 -0.074651 -0.010849 -0.042809 -0.242575 -0.287617 
GDPT(-1) -0.418869 -0.398828 -0.418178 0.930584 1.000000 -0.014113 -0.056365 0.006449 -0.031470 -0.191156 -0.224903 
INDEB_C -0.620125 -0.646542 -0.597828 -0.036905 -0.014113 1.000000 0.991100 0.994212 0.987268 0.072030 0.017659 
INDEB_C(-1) -0.577269 -0.608478 -0.554853 -0.074651 -0.056365 0.991100 1.000000 0.985179 0.993917 0.073096 0.037934 
INDEB_ML -0.651845 -0.690246 -0.628163 -0.010849 0.006449 0.994212 0.985179 1.000000 0.992797 -0.035543 -0.086124 
INDEBT_ML(-1) -0.616136 -0.659743 -0.592180 -0.042809 -0.031470 0.987268 0.993917 0.992797 1.000000 -0.033271 -0.072353 
INDEB_S 0.283139 0.393910 0.270683 -0.242575 -0.191156 0.072030 0.073096 -0.035543 -0.033271 1.000000 0.963822 
INDEB_S(-1) 0.362616 0.475638 0.348253 -0.287617 -0.224903 0.017659 0.037934 -0.086124 -0.072353 0.963822 1.000000 
NOTE: 1. ADF are the augmented Dickey Fuller tests for the null hypothesis of non stationarity (unit root). The asterisk *, **, *** represent those tests which reject the null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, 1% 
respectively. 
          2. KPSS is Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test for the null hypothesis of stationarity . The asterisks *, **, *** for this test represent those tests which reject the null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
